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Abstract. - Consider a locational game on a network in which two competing facilities charge 
fixed, but not necessarily equal, and the decision variables are their locations. 
Rather than deciding in a given whether Or not an equilibrium exists, we a stability 
index that measures the stahility or instability oj a given situation. In other that an 
equilibrium exists, our index indicates how much external effort (or subsidy) is to destTOY 
that equilibrium; if equilibria do not exist, the index shows how much external (or tax) is 
needed to "generate" an equilibrium. Computational evidence Jor randomly generated problems 
is presented. 
Keywords: Competitive location, Nash equilibria, stability. 
Resume. - Nous considerons un jeu de localisation dans un reseau avec deux etablissements 
eompt!iitifs, des mais flI!cessairement egaux. Les variables de decision som les 
localisations des lieu de determiner s'il y a un dans une certaine 
situation, nous construiTOns un indice de stahl/1M qui mesure la ou l'instabilite d'un 
arrangement de localisations. En d'autres tumes. si un equilibre notre indice combien 
d' effort exthieur (ou de subvention) est necessaire Dour detTUire eel n' existe 
pas, I'indice indique combien 
equilibre. Nous presen/ons des 
Mots c!es : Problcmes de localisation compeliti ve, indice de stabilitc. resultats nurncriques. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The model that forms the basis of this paper has its roots in the work 
of Hotel1ing (1929). In his model two dupolists locate on a linear market, 
i.e. a line segment with potential customers distributed along the 
market. The products offered by the competitors are homogeneous, and 
customers make their purchases from the cheapest source, The decision 
variables available to each of the two competitors are price and location. 
Hotelling concluded that if both duopolists were to charge equal prices and 
locate at the center of the market, a Nash equilibrium would be reached, 
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i.e. a situation in which neither competitor can unilaterally improve its profit 
by changing its price or location. Even though d' As premont et a!. (1979) 
showed that Hotelling's argument was flawed, his analysis has become the 
basis of a plethora of competitive spatial models put forward by researchers 
over the last sixty years. 
Most subsequent authors have focused on existence and uniqueness of 
equilibria in HoteHing models. For some introductory surveys, the reader 
is referred to Graitson (1982), Greenhut eta!' (1987), Friesz eta!. (1988), 
Hakimi (1990), Gabszewicz and Thisse (1986 and 1991), Eiselt et a!. (1993), 
and Labbe et a!. (1993). The discussion of equilibria is the focusses almost 
exclusively on the yes - no dichotomy: either an equilibrium exists or it 
docs not. Clearly, life is more subtle than that (and so is the theory of 
location games i). For instance, in physics we distinguish between stable 
self-restoring), neutral, and unstable equilibria. A similar approach is taken in 
this paper, where we replace the "equilibrium - no equilibrium" dichotomy 
by a continuum that is separated by a "stability line", a line that separates 
equilibria from non-equilibria. Loosely speaking, points on the continuum 
express the degree of stability (instability) in case an eqUilibrium does (or 
does not) exist by the distance of a given situation from the stability line. 
The introduction of stability in the discussion of competitive situations is 
not entirely new, though, Schofield (1978) studied stability in the context 
of dynamic games, more recently Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) and Wilson 
(1992) have employed the notion of stability in general two-person games. 
Stability of equilibria is also a topic that is well known and studied in 
political science and voting theory, see, e.g., Kramer (1977) and Tovey 
(1991 and 1993). The discussion in this paper will focus exclusively on the 
stability of locational games. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the second section 
we introduce our basic model and develop the stability index. In the third 
section we discuss the case in with equilibria exist, in the fourth section 
we investigate the case of disequilibria, and in the fifth section we present 
some results of computational experiments. We conclude by offering some 
thoughts on possible extensions of our results. 
2. THE BASIC MODEL 
Even though our arguments can be applied to competitive location 
problems with any number of competitors in arbitrary spaces, we will 
illustrate most of our concepts for a duapoly on a graph. For that purpose, 
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define a graph G = (V, E) with set of vertices V { V1, VZ, ... , and 
set of edges E = : Vi, Vj E V}. The demand is assumed to occur 
at vertices and is fixed (implying that we are dealing with an essential good), 
its magnitude is 11) (v.,) ;::: 0, If Vi E V. Let a positive distance be associated 
with each edge and the distance between two vertices Vi and vJ is then 
defined as the shortest path between Vi and vJ , denoted by diJ. Competitors 
A and B arc currently located at vertices VA. and VB, respectively. Both 
charge mill prices, i.e. customers pick up the good at the facility and have to 
pay for the transport separately. The mill prices are Ji.-1. and JiB, respectively, 
so that, given unit transportation costs, the delivered prices of a customer at 
Vi are P.~ + dA.i from facility A and JiB + diB from facility R Customers 
purchase from the facility that offers the lowest delivered price. 
We can generally distinguish between two models concerning customer 
behavioL 
"Winner-take-all" means that a customer at a vertex Vi purchases w 
units from facility A, if PA + diA < PB + dlB, and similarly from facility B. 
In case of equal delivered prices, customers satisfy their entire demand from 
the supplier with the lower mill price. This assumption is quite arbitrary and 
madc solely for the reason of unequivocally describing the competitors' profit 
functions. Changing this assumption does in no way impede our arguments, 
In a "proportional model" customers purchase from both facilities. The 
proportion of their demand that they satisfy from a facility depends on the 
relation between the two delivered prices. In this paper we assume that a 
customer at v, will purchase ( (PB + diB )/[(PA + diAl + (PB + diB)] ) W 
from facility A and {(PA + di4.)/[(PA. + di.~) + (PB + diH)] ) 11) from 
facility H. As an example, if the mill prices charged by A and B are 
3 and 5, respectively, and a customer is located 7 miles from A and 3 miles 
from B, then the delivered prices are 10 and 8, respectively, and if the 
demand of the customer is 54, then in this model the customer will purchase 
[8/10+8](54)= 24 units from A and llOll 0 + 8](54) 30 units from facility H. 
In both the winner-take-all and the proportional model, facilities A and 
B compete exclusively by adjusting their locations. More specifically, the 
planning facility will consider its opponent's location temporarily fixed and 
relocate to the vertex that offers the highest profit. We will refer to a 
locational game with simultaneous moves, if A and H (in a general n-person 
game: all players) optimize and relocate simultanously. Similarly, we call a 
10cational game sequential, if facilities A and B optimize and relocate in 
an alternating sequence (in general n-person games: in a fixed order). In 
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this paper we only consider simultaneous moves. Note that this also 
that we cannot prohibit location of the facilities at the same vertex as is 
in case of sequential moves. We assume inertia to prevail, i.e. if a 
competitor's highest profit is achieved at its current location as well as at 
some other vertex, it will not move. 
With the above assumptions, we are now able to construct an index that 
measures the stability of locational arrangements on a given graph. Loosely 
speaking, the stability index developed in the following measures how much 
incentive, i.e. subsidy, it takes to an equilibrium provided one exists; 
or how much disincentive, i.e. tax. it takes to create an equilibrium, given 
that none exists in the original model. 
3. THE CASE OF EQUILIBRIA 
We first consider the case in which equilibria exist. To facilitate the 
discussion, we consider anyone of the equilibria. Denote the current profits 
of the facilities by and respectively. By definition, given facility 
E's current location, there is no place A could move to and achieve a 
profit level higher than , the same is true for facility E, Let now 
8J!-2 denote the highest profits A (E) could possibly enjoy if it 
were forced out of the equilibrium under consideration; the superscript 
indicating a facility's move from equilibrium to the second-best solution, 
its opponent's current location. Then PA. (L~ + is the smallest 
loss facility A (E) would sustain if it wcre forced to move out 
provided facility B (A) does not move. Ignoring inertia 
for a moment, L:; + ~JA. = - 8J!-2 is the dollar amount which leaves 
the decision maker at facility A indifferent between at its current 
location and moving to the next-best location. Defining flJD similarly, 
we can then compute = min { L:; + fl.J A; 8JB ), so that L:; + + E with 
> 0 but arbitrarily small, is the smallest subsidy which, if offered to each 
of the players for moving out of his current location, would be accepted by 
at least one of them, and thus destroys the equilibrium. Note that in case of 
mUltiple equilibria. we would have to compute values for each of them, 
the maximum value among all L:; + plus some small £ is then sufficient to 
any of the equilibria in the model. 
It stands to reason that a problem, in which it takes a lot effort or money 
to convince facilities to move out of an equilibrium, will be called stable. 
Similarly, if small amounts of subsidy are sufficient to make facilities move 
out of their equilibria, the problem will be considered fairly unstable. Hence, 
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we use the expression L:; + as indicator for the 
equilibria. 
of a oroblem' 
We should point out that our stability index as defined above is a purely 
local criterion in the sense that it only considers how to convince facilities 
to move out of an equilibrium situation; what happens after such a move is 
completely ignored. A one-time subsidy payment such as the one discussed 
here will temporarily move facilities out of an equilibrium, but in repeated 
subsequent moves the facilities may return to the same equilibrium as appears 
to be the case in many situations. 'The situation is different if the subsidy 
were offered in each step. However, if the facilities actually do return to 
an equilibrium or if the system is permanently thrown out of 
is of no consequence here. 
As an example for the computation of the stability index consider the case 
of two facilities locating at the vertices of a tree. Suppose that facilities locate 
at the same vertex, and assume that their mill prices p are fixed and 
It is well known that an equilibrium is reached if both facilities locate at a 
median, see, e.g., Riselt and Laporte (1991). Denote the median by Vq and 
let Ti, , ... be subtrees that are generated by deleting from the given tree 
Vq and all edges incident to it. The weight of a tree or subtree is denoted 
w (1:f1) and defined as the sum of weights of all vertices included in the tree. 
We can now order the subtress, so that w (l?)'?:uJ (1jQ), Vi < j. Finally, 
define v,~ as the unique vertex in that is adjacent to the median vq . 
With A and E locating at Vq at equilibrium, the two facilities share the total 
1 
demand w (7') equally, i.e. sales of the two facilities arc 8A = = 2 w 
1 
and profits are ~J~ = 2 p'IV (T). Assume noW that facility E were forced 
out of equilibrium to any other vertex on the tree. Eiselt and Laporte (1991) 
have shown that E's best option would be to locate at 7)~, thus capturing 
sales of = w (TJ 1 leaving the remaining w (T) 'IV to A .. 
Consequently, = p (7') 71J and = pw (7''/.). Facility 
B's loss is then p D w (1') -w (T.() l The computations would be identical 
if facility A were to move out of eqUIlibrium rather than thus our 
index is L:; + P D w -w ('Tn] . This implies that whenever the weight 
of the largest subtree generated by.the median is small, our stabilitv index 
L:; + assumes a value. This coincides with the intuitive notion of 
as a small weight of the largest subtree imDlies that the wei!!ht of the entire 
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tree is widely distributed among the subtrees. Such a distribution would 
be considered balanced, a situation that is usually associated with stability, 
confirming ·the above result. 
4. THE CASE OF DISEQUILIBRIA 
In this section we consider the case in which equilibria do not exist. Define 
as the profit that is realized by facility A in period t, and similar 
Furthermore, let denote the profit facility A. anticipates to 
achieve in period (t+ 1) while it plans in period t to maximize its profit in the 
succeeding period, assuming that facility B remains at its current location. 
Then .6.- fJ.4. (t) = PA (t) Pn (t) indicates the benefit derived by facility 
A when it relocates, and similar for.6.- PB (t). Clearly, jf .6.- ~JA (t) > 0, 
facility A will move, assuming zero relocation costs. In other words, it 
would take a fixed disincentive, or tax, of .6.- fJA (t) to stop facility A from 
moving in period t. Neither facility will move provided that .6.- fJ.4 (t) ~ 0 
and .6.- 'PB (t)~ O. Defining .6.- 'P (t) = max {.6. - ~JA .6. - fJB }, we 
can state ncithcr facility will movc in period t as long as .6.- fJ (t) ~ O. Then 
a disincentive of .6.- = mint { .6.- fJ } assures that the relocation process 
stops cventually. We know, but for the moment ignore, the fact that the value 
.6. - clearly depends on the initial location of the two facilities. Moreover, we 
will see that it also depends on the choice of tiebreaker. In other words, if a 
facility that considers relocation has more than one optimal choice, we have 
to specify the rule for choosing the next location. In essence, this leaves us 
with four cases to consider: 
(a) The initial location is fixed and so is the tiebreaker rule. 
(b) The initial location is fixed and ties are broken randomly. 
(c) All initial locations are considered the tiebreaker rule is fixed. 
(d) All initial locations are considered and ties are broken randomly. 
For computational convenience we will denote the disincentives required 
to interrupt the process of relocation in the four above by .6.;, .6.;, 
and .6.'d. A few simple relations about the disincentives in the four cases 
are readily apparent. For instance, .6.; ~.6.;:- and .6.; ~ . Also, in case 
(a) there is only one cycle which has to be interpreted whereas in case (b), 
there may be many and since the idea is to stop movements eventually, it 
is sufficient to interrupt any of the cycles, hence .6.; ~.6.; and, similarly, 
.6.; ~ .6.a. 
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A simple example of a location problem on a linear market may explain 
cases and (d). Let a linear market, i.e. a line segment, extend from 0 to L 
with denoting the center of the market. Two facilities A and B can locate 
anywhere on that market. Following Eiselt (1992), we can define sufficient 
spatial separation (S 8 8) as a distance equal to the price differential charged 
at the two facilities. If two facilities are at least S 8 8 apart, then neither 
of them is cut out. The concept of S 8 5 is similar to Eaton and Lipsey's 
(1975) "zero conjectural variation", the latter being, however, a behavioral 
assumption whereas 558 is simply a measure of distance. Formally, let PA 
and PB denote the fixed prices charged at facilities A and B, respectively, 
and assume that P.4 < PD. Now, whenever facilities A and B are less than 
555 = IPA P B I distance units apart, then the cheaper facility A undercuts 
the more expensive facility B, leaving the latter with no market at all. On 
the other hand, if A and B are farther apart than SSS, then each captures 
its own hinterland (Le. the area facing away from its opponent) and some 
of the competitive region between them. Consequently, A will always try 
to locate closer than S S S to B and gain the entire market, whereas B will 
locate SSS + £, £ > 0 but arbitrarily small, distance units away from A. 
towards the longer side of A. In doing so, B does not get anything in the 
competitive region but captures its own hinterland. If S S S ~ L, then A could 
locate at L/2, cut out B anywhere on the market, and capture everything. 
Consider now the case of SSS < L and let x and y be two points given by 
x = 1 [L _ SS5] and y ~ [L + SSS] as shown in Figure 1. Suppose now 
that facilities A and B engage in sequential relocation, where one facility 
relocates so as to maximize its profit, then the other facility maximizes 
its own profit on the basis of its opponent's location. This process is then 
repeated until either an equilibrium is reached, or, in case no equilibrium 
exists, it continues indefinitely. We first show that, regardless of the facilities' 
initial locations, facility A will eventually locate between points x and y. 
Suppose this were not so. Without loss of generality, let A locate between 0 
and x. Based on the above discussion, B then locates to the right of A at a 
SSSQ SS~ " ,. ... .. 
~ ~ 
e 
o 
x z 1I2 Y L 
Figure 1. 
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distance of 858 + c. B may now be located to the right or to the left of J.:, 
but it surely locates to the left of y. Assuming that A. moves just as much 
as absolutelY necessary, it moves to the right just enought to be closer than 
585 to B. This move again pushes facility B to the right. The relocation 
continues until A locates at or to the right of x, 
Suppose now that .4 is located between x and y at a point z as shown in 
Figure I and assume that it is now B's turn to move. As £1 has just moved, 
it controls the entire market and B's market share is currently zero. B now 
moves 555 + c distance units to the right to point t. At t, B captures its own 
1 
hinterland which is 'lL ~ 855] E. which is also B's gain in the move as 
2 ' 
it captured nothing before. As E [0; 555/2]' B's gain is in the interval 
~ 555; L/2 588/2]. 1f there were a relocation cost or tax of this 
amount, then B would no longer move. This is our instability measure D.. - . 
Note that for small values of i.e. similar prices, B's potential gain and 
the instability index is large. This is not really surprising as similar prices 
indicate a climate of active competition in which a slightly more expensive 
facility has a lot to lose when it is cut out. 
Consider now the case of competitive locations on a network C. 1n 
order to compute values for D.. - , it is useful to construct a competition graph 
GC =: (NC , as suggested by Biselt and Bhadury (1993). The competition 
graphs for sequential and simultaneous moves are substantially different; here 
we are only concerned with the competition graph for simultaneous moves. 
The set of nodes N' = ( j) } is defined for each possible pair of locations 
of the duopolists, Le. the competition graph has 0 (IV nodes. The set 
of arcs A = [ o,ij, kl I is defined as follows. Assume that facility "4 currently 
locates at vertex Vi and facility B locates at Vj in the original graph G. 
Given B's location at , A's optimal location is at vertex Vb given A's 
location at Vi, B's optimal location is at vertex VI. If ties exist for the 
maximum, arcs from Vj to all such vertices 7)k exist. As an example, 
consider the graph in Figure 2 in which the double-digit numbers next to 
the vertices denote their weights and the single-digit numbers near the edges 
indicate the distances. 
Given prices P.4 3 and PB = 5, Figure 3 a shows the competition 
graph associated with the graph in Figure 2 on the basis of the winner-
take-all assumption. The competition graph in Figure 3 b is based on the 
proportional model. 
As an example for its construction, consider A and B both locating at V3. 
Presently, facility A. undercuts B and hence captures all three vertices of 
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30 40 60 
Figure 2. 
500 300 200 
350 
Figure 3 a, 
Figure 3 b, 
the graph, whereas facility B gets nothing. The currently realized profits are 
390 and rJ'B (t)=O. Given B's location at 7)3, A's best option is to 
stay at V3, still undercutting B and capturing the entire demand on the tree; 
its anticipated profit is ~~1 =390, Similarly, given A's current location at 7)3, 
B's optimal strategy is to move to 'VI or 7)2; in both cases B will capture 
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the demand at vertices VI and V2 for an anticipated profit of fPB = 350. Thus 
the competition graph has arcs leading from node (3, 3) to nodes (3, 1) and 
2). Note that if a node in the competition graph has outdegree zero, it 
constitutes an equilibrium. In the case under discussion in this section such 
a node does not exist. Finally, as discussed above, the smallest tax required 
to stop any further moves at some point where A is located at Vi and B at vJ 
is 6.- fP(t). In the above example, 6.- fP(t) max {390-390; 350-0} =350. 
In other words, if the two facilities were both located at V3, then a tax of 
at least $ 350 would stifle any further moves and force an "equilibrium". In 
the competition graph, we assign such values 6.- fP to all nodes. In the 
following these values will be referred to as numerical labels. 
We are now able to discuss the four aforementioned cases in detaiL As 
assumption no equilibrium exists and the number of possible locations is 
finite, facilities A, and B must eventually reach a pair of locations that they 
located at earlier. We will refer to any such path as a relocation path 
In terms of the competition graph, each relocation path has the shape of a 
looking glass - a path leads from an original pair of locations (i, .i) to some 
other pair of locations (k, I), and from there starts a cycle that eventually 
returns to node (k, I). In other words, relocation paths in GC consists of a 
and a cycle with the set of arcs on the path possibly empty. In case of a 
fixed tie-breaking rule, only one reloeation path Pij needs to be considered, 
in case of breaking ties randomly (with each choice having a strictly positive 
probability), all possible paths need to be known. The smallest numerical 
label of a node on any path Pij is able to stop moves on that particular 
path and thus constitutes the desired tax 6. -. We are now able to discuss 
the four cases introduced earlier. 
Case a: The initial locations are fixed and there is a fixed tie-breaking 
rule. Only one relocation path Pij exists and 6.- is the minimum over all 
nodes on Fij. As an example, consider the location pair (VI, VI) in the 
above example and suppose that tics are broken according to a maximum 
index rule. The relocation path is constructed directly from the competition 
graph and is shown in Figure 4 with the numerical labels 6.- fP next to 
the nodes. In this example it takes a tax of 6.; = min {500, 300, 300, ISO, 
350, 21O} = 180 to stifle all moves. 
Case b: The initial location is fixed and tics are broken randomly. 
Given that ties are broken randomly with each choice having a positive 
probability, the goal is to interrupt the relocation process eventually. A 
simple approach to accomplish this is to determine all paths and cycles in 
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1--------t ..~(2.1 
210 350 
Figure 4. 
the competition graph that can be reached from a given starting node (i, 
6.;;- is then the minimum taken over the 6.; values of all relocation paths so 
determined. However, it is sufficient to determine all nodes in GC that can 
be reached from the initial node .i). Then the smallest numerical label of 
any of these nodes will indicate the disincentive required to stop relocations 
at some time in the process. Finding the set of nodes reachable from the 
fixed starting point (i, .i) can be achieved by any of the well-known shortest 
methods. Then define 8ij as the set of nodes that can be reached from 
the desired value 6.- is the minimum taken over the numerical labels 
of all nodes in 8ij. As an example, consider the problem in Figure 2 with 
the competition graph in Figure 3 a. Let the starting node again be (1, 1). 
Detailed computations can be found in Table. 
(l< 
° 
TABLE 
Nodes reachable from (1. 4) in a steps 
1 ) 
(1, 2) 
(2,2) 
(2,3) 
(3, 3) 
(3. I), (3, 2) 
U fp (t) 
500 
300 
300 
180 
350 
210,210 
From the last column we infer that = 180, so that a tax of $lSO is 
sufficient to force a standstill in the relocation process. 
Case c: All initial locations are considered and the tiebreaker rule is fixed. 
In principle, we could repeat the procedure described under case a for all 
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of locations, Le. nodes in Gt:, and select 6. - as the maximum 
of all 6.- values computed in case a. This task can, however, be simplified 
Consider again a relocation path that starts at node 
on a path to and the cycle returns to l). The minimum tax that 
stifles the relocation process is either determined by an arc on the path or on 
the cycle of the relocation path. However, not only relocations on the path 
anywhere between ('i" ,i) and (k, I) must be stopped, but relocations on all 
other paths as well. In particular, consider the relocation path that starts at 
node (k, I). In order to stop its moves, it is mandatory to stifle relocation 
on the cycle which is the same as the cycle part of the relocation path that 
starts at In other words, it is sufficient to consider a subgraph of 
G" that contains only nodes that are located on a cycle. We define such a 
as the reduced subf!ravh Grc ( NTc. ATC ) which is obtained from 
the 
- Delete all nodes with zero indegree and the arcs leading out of them. 
- Repeat until no more nodes with zero indegree exist. 
The reduced competition graph of Figure 3 a is shown in Figure 5. 
500 300 
180 
300 
210 210 350 
3.2 
Figure 5. 
We are now able to describe a 'oceaure that finds time. 
1: For all nodes in GTC, find the relocation 
its nodes that are also in G'c with node labels 
Step 2: Create a list L = and let (k, I) be the vertex with the smallest 
numerical label. 
Step 3: Add all node labels of (k, I) to L. 
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4: If L Nrc, STOP; else let (k, I) be the vertex with the next 
smallest label and go to step 3. 
The idea of the above procedure is as follows. If a node j) 
has been assigned node labels (kl' lr), ,l2), ... ,then node ('i, j) is on 
relocations paths that start at nodes (kl' II), (k2, [2), etc. In other words, 
stopping the relocation process at node j) interrupts all relocation paths 
that start at any of its node labels. We now have to find the lowest cost to 
interrupt all paths, i.e. find a collection of nodes the union of whose labels 
equals 1"fT' and whose largest numerical label is as small as possible. This 
is achieved the above 
Consider the above example with the maximum index rule as tie 
breaker. Here, nodes (2, 2), (2, 3), (3, 2), and (3, 3) receive node labels 
(l, 2), 2), (2, 3), (3, I), (3, 2), (3, 3)] Nrc and the remaining 
labels are [(1, 1), (3, I)J for node (I, I), [(1, 1), (1,2), (3, 1)] for node 
2). and [(3, 1)] for node (3, I). T-tle smallest numerical label of any node 
in N r, is ISO, it is associated with node (2, 3). As L Nrc already in 
the first iteration, the algorithm terminates with the conclusion that a tax of 
6.;:- = $ ISO is sufficient to stifle all further movements. 
Case d: This case can be solved by applying the procedure described 
under (b) for 0 ) times. The tax Si is then the maximum value of 6.i;, 
taken over all initial nodes in the competition graph. There does not appear 
to be an obvious shortcut to this method. In our 6.;; = 180. 
We are now finally able to define our stability index 6.. In case an 
equilibrium exists, we set 6. +6.+, the positive sign indicates that at one 
of the facilities a subsidy payment is received. On the other hand, if an 
equilibrium does not exist, we set 6. = -6.-, the negative sign indicating 
that the facilities are charged a payment, or tax, for relocating. 
5. COMPUTATIONAL RESULTS 
A number of graphs were randomly and relocation 
at fixed initial locations were computed 
models. A number of different combinations of prices were 
examined and stability indices were computed. Note that in the case of equal 
prices we have assumed the facilities to be distinguishable in the sense that 
A locating at vertex Vi and B at vJ is considered different from A locating 
at Vj and B at Vi. The graphs have between 15 and 25 vertices and between 
24 and 44 edges. 
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In case of equal prices, both winner-take-all and the proportional model 
produced the same results: either an equilibrium exists with a 50 percent 
market share and profit for each facility, or no equilibrium exists, In those 
cases, we computed the average market share and profit on the cycle which 
turned out to be a 50-50 split as well. In cases of unequal prices, none 
of the examples showed an equilibrium, This behavior of the model is 
straightforward in winner-take-all models, as the less expensive facility will 
always move to the current location of its opponent where it can cut out 
its opponent and capture the entire market. At the same time the more 
expensive facility will move away from such an arrangement, so that the 
lack of equilibria in these cases is no surprise. The proportional model does 
not offer a similar, easy, solution, 
An interesting observation concerns the proportional model with 
prices in which no equilibrium existed. We varied the prices from PA 
pn=0,5 to 10 or 20, and computed the 6,- values, i,e, the "immobilization 
cost", as a function of the prices, These immobilization cost first rose with 
the prices as expected, but then eclipsed and decreased, and reached zero 
at which point an equilibrium existed, The 6, - values occurred 
somewhere in the vicinity of PA PB L It is not known whether or not 
this is a provable property, 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we have introducted a measure of stability for competitive 
location models. This measure indicates how much incentive is required to 
force facilities out of an equilibrium, given that one exists, or how much 
disincentive is needed to stop the relocation process and thus immobilize the 
facilities, It is then shown how to compute the index and the calculations were 
demonstrated by an example. Some computational results are also provided. 
One strand of further research could investigate whether or not anything 
can be said for the stability index for trees or general graphs. Another question 
is if a specific stability in the winner-take-all model has any implications for 
the proportional model in the same graph or vice versa. Also, nothing much 
is presently known about the proportional model, not even on trees, as far as 
equilibria are concerned. In general, it appears that the proportional model 
is much more well-behaved and less volatile than the winner-take-all 
but we have to see if further studies bear this out. 
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